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Summary 
This article demonstrates that when finite lifetime is introduced in a Lucas (1988) 
growth model, the environmental policy may enhance growth both in the short- and the 
long-run, while pollution does not influence educational activities, labor supply is not 
elastic and human capital does not enter the utility function. This is because finite 
lifetime and the appearance of newborns at each date creates a turnover of generations 
which disconnects the aggregate consumption growth to the interest rate. We show that 
the shorter is the horizon, the greater the effect of the environmental policy on growth, 
because the higher the “generational turnover effect”. We also demonstrate that when 
time is not the single production factor in education, the environmental policy promotes 
growth only if time remains the predominant factor. Otherwise, the crowding-out effect 
of the tighter environmental policy dominates the “generational turnover effect” and 
growth diminishes. Finally, when the source of pollution is final output rather than 
physical capital and time is the single factor in education, the environmental does not 
affect growth in the steady-state, despite the “generational turnover effect”. 
Nevertheless, if the education good is introduced, the positive influence of the 
environmental policy appears again. 
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1 Introduction
While the link between environment and growth has already been extendedly investigated since
the 80s (see Xepapadeas, 2005; Brock and Taylor, 2005), conclusions about the inﬂuence of the
environmental policy on economic growth remain open.
The purpose of this article is to contribute to the debate, by re-examining the inﬂuence of the
environmental policy on growth when ﬁnite lifetime is taken into account, in an economy where
growth is driven by human capital accumulation. It demonstrates that ﬁnite lifetime introduces
a new channel of transmission between the environment and economic performances based on
the turnover of generations. Conversely to previous works in the ﬁeld, a win-win environmental
policy may be implemented while pollution does not inﬂuence educational activities, labor
supply is inelastic and human capital does not enter the utility function.
Most of the industrialized countries are now becoming knowledge- and education-based
economies using more and more human capital instead of physical capital to produce. And
education played a major role in the industrialization of the South-East Asian countries during
7os and 80s decades.1 Nevertheless, few theoretical works investigate environmental issues
in a framework where human capital is the engine of growth and economic prosperities. A
noteworthy exception is the seminal article by Gradus and Smulders (1993) where authors
demonstrate that, in a model à la Lucas (1988) where pollution originates from physical capital,
the environmental concerns do not inﬂuence the steady-state growth rate of human capital
accumulation, but when pollution is assumed to inﬂuence education activities, the engine of
growth.2 This result comes from the fact that the growth rate of consumption relies on the
after-tax interest rate and the rate of time preferences and that the tax-rate is invariant with
pollution tax in the steady-state when labor supply is inelastic. When the environmental
1See World Bank (1993) for empirical evidence of this role. Grimaud and Tournemaine (2007) point out
this role to justify the need to investigate the link between environment and growth through the channel of
education.
2Speciﬁcally, pollution may inﬂuence education in two ways. Either by depreciating the stock of human
capital (the case of Gradus and Smulders, 1993), or by reducing the ability to train (as shown by van Ewijk
and van Wijnbergen, 1995).X. Pautrel – Environmental policy, human capital and growth with ﬁnite lifetimes 3
taxation increases, the after-tax interest rate reduces and becomes lower than the returns to
human capital. Consequently, the investment in physical capital drops in favor to human
capital accumulation. Final production becomes more intensive in human capital and the
allocation of human capital in production diminishes. This mechanism perpetuates until the
after-tax interest rate backs to its initial value equal to the rate of returns in human capital
accumulation. Because the aggregate consumption growth in the steady-state relies only on
the after-tax interest rate, it is not modiﬁed by the higher pollution tax.
Assuming that labor supply is elastic and pollution originates from the stock of physical
capital, Hettich (1998) ﬁnds a positive inﬂuence of the environmental policy on human capital
accumulation, in a Lucas’ setting. The increase in the environmental tax compels ﬁrms to in-
crease their abatement activities at the expense of the household’s consumption. To counteract
this negative eﬀect, households substitute leisure to education and the growth rate rises. Nev-
ertheless, the author demonstrates that his result is very sensitive to the assumption about the
source of pollution. When the source of pollution is ﬁnal output rather than physical capital,
the link between the environment and growth does not longer exist. By taxing output, a higher
tax reduces both the returns to physical capital and the wage rate which contributes to the
returns to education. The incentives for agents to invest more in education vanish.
More recently, in a model combining Research & Development activities and human capital
accumulation à la Lucas, where education directly enters the utility function as a consumption
good and knowledge from R&D reduces the ﬂow of pollution emissions, Grimaud and Tourne-
maine (2007) demonstrate that a tighter environmental policy promotes growth. By increasing
the price of the good whose production pollutes the higher tax rate reduces the relative cost
of education and therefore incites agents to invest in human capital accumulation. Because
education is the engine of growth, the growth rises in the steady-state. As highlighted by the
authors, the key assumption is the introduction of the education as a consumption good in
utility which lets the returns to education dependent from the environmental policy. When
education does not inﬂuence utility, the returns to education is exogenous and therefore is notX. Pautrel – Environmental policy, human capital and growth with ﬁnite lifetimes 4
aﬀected by the policy.
In the present article, we re-examine the link between the environmental policy and growth
in a Lucas’ setting, assuming just that lifetime is ﬁnite. We use a Yaari (1965) - Blanchard
(1985) overlapping generations model where growth is driven by human capital accumulation à
la Lucas (1988) and pollution arises from physical capital. We study both the long-run balanced
growth path and the transition.
Our results are threefold. First, we demonstrate that when lifetime is ﬁnite and physical
capital is the source of pollution, a tighter environmental policy enhances growth even if pol-
lution does not aﬀect educational activities, labor supply is inelastic and human capital does
not enter the utility function. Indeed, ﬁnite lifetime introduces a turnover of generations which
disconnects aggregate consumption growth to the interest rate. This “generational turnover
eﬀect” incites individuals to invest in human capital (the non-polluting factor) and oﬀsets the
crowding-out eﬀect tied to the reduction of the returns to physical capital, not only during the
transition but also in the steady-state. Second, when we relax the assumption that only time
is required to educate and we assume that an education good is used as input in education
activities, the “generational turnover eﬀect” continues to operate and the environmental policy
enhances growth, only if the part of the education good in human capital accumulation re-
mains small. Otherwise, the crowding-out eﬀect leads the environmental policy to be harmful
to growth. Finally, when the source of pollution is ﬁnal output rather than physical capital,
the environmental policy does not inﬂuence growth in the Lucas’ setting, for the reasons em-
phasized by Hettich (1998). Nevertheless, when the education good is introduced, the positive
inﬂuence of the environmental policy appears again.
In section 2, we expose the model. Section 3 investigates the steady-state equilibrium.
Section 4 examines the transitional dynamics of the model and compare the transitional eﬀects
of a tighter environmental policy on the economy when lifetime is ﬁnite and inﬁnite, using
numerical simulations. Section 5 discusses results, assuming alternative assumptions about
production factors in education and the source of pollution. Section 6 concludes.X. Pautrel – Environmental policy, human capital and growth with ﬁnite lifetimes 5
2 The model
Let’s consider a Blanchard (1985) overlapping generations model with human capital accumu-
lation and environmental concerns. Time is continuous. Each individual born at time s faces a
constant probability of death per unit of time λ ≥ 0. Consequently his life expectancy is 1/λ.
When λ increases, the life span decreases. At time s, a cohort of size λ is born. At time t, this
cohort has a size equal to λe−λ(t−s) and the constant population is equal to
R t
−∞ λe−λ(t−s)ds.
There are insurance companies and there is no bequest motive.
The expected utility function of an agent born at s ≤ t is:3
Z ∞
s
[logcs,t − ζ logPt]e
−(%+λ)(t−s)dt (1)
where cs,t denotes consumption in period t of an agent born at time s, % ≥ 0 is the rate
of time preference and ζ measures the weight in utility attached to the environment, that is
environmental care.
The representative agent can increase his stock of human capital by devoting time to school-
ing, according to Lucas (1988):
˙ hs,t = B [1 − us,t]hs,t (2)
where B is the eﬃciency of schooling activities, us,t ∈]0,1[ is the part of human capital allocated
to productive activities at time t for the generation born at s and hs,t is the stock of human
capital at time t of an individual born at time s. Note that we make no assumption about the
inﬂuence of pollution on individual human capital accumulation.
Households face the following budget constraint:
˙ as,t = [rt + λ]as,t + us,ths,twt − cs,t (3)
where as,t is the ﬁnancial wealth in period t and ωt represents the wage rate per eﬀective unit of
human capital us,ths,t. The representative agent chooses the time path for cs,t and his working
3We use logarithmic utility to simplify the study of the transitional dynamics. In appendix D, we demonstrate
that our results remain valid when the intertemporal elasticity of substitution of the consumption is diﬀerent
from unity.X. Pautrel – Environmental policy, human capital and growth with ﬁnite lifetimes 6
time us,t by maximizing (1) subject to (2) and (3). It yields
˙ cs,t = [r − %]cs,t (4)
Integrating (3) and (4) and combining the results gives the consumption at time t of an agent
born at time s:





t [rζ+λ]dζdν is the present value of lifetime earning.It also gives
the equality between the rate of return to human capital and the eﬀective rate of interest:
˙ wt
wt
+ B = rt + λ (5)
Due to the simple demographic structure, all individual variables are additive across individuals.





−λ(t−s)ds = (% + λ)[Kt + Ωt] (6)
where Ωt ≡
R t












We assume that the human capital of an agent born at current date, ht,t, is inherited from the
dying generation.4 Because the mechanism of intergenerational transmission of knowledge is
complex, we make the simplifying assumption that the human capital inherited from the dying
generation is a constant part of the aggregate level of human capital such that ht,t = ηHt with
η ∈ ]0,1[ (see Song, 2002).
4This assumption is not crucial for our results. Assuming that ht,t is exogenous would give the same
qualitative results.X. Pautrel – Environmental policy, human capital and growth with ﬁnite lifetimes 7










, 0 < α < 1
with Yt being the aggregate ﬁnal output.
R t
−∞ us,ths,tλe−λ(t−s)ds is the amount of the aggregate
stock of human capital used in production.
Following Gradus and Smulders (1993), pollution ﬂow is assumed to increase with the stock







, γ > 0 (8)
We assume that the government implements an environmental policy to incite ﬁrms to re-
duce their net ﬂow of pollution. To do so, the government taxes the net ﬂow of pollution by
ﬁrms and transfers to them the fruit of the taxes to fund their abatement activities. Conse-
quently, ﬁrms under perfect competition pay a pollution tax on their net pollution Pt and they
choose their abatement activities Dt (whose cost equals Dt) and the amount of factors which






t where ϑt is
the pollution tax rate and T
p
t denotes transfers from the public sector with T
p
t = ϑtPt. Firms

















Dt = ϑtγPt (10)





. Because in the long-run the
net ﬂow of pollution must be constant to have a constant environmental quality, the environ-
mental tax is assumed to evolve at the same rate of growth than the stock of physical capital.5
5It is quite easy to demonstrate that this assumption is veriﬁed in the centralized economy.X. Pautrel – Environmental policy, human capital and growth with ﬁnite lifetimes 8
Intuitively, ϑt increases over time to encourage ﬁrms to increase abatement activities to limit
pollution which rises with the physical capital stock. Consequently, we deﬁne τ ≡ ϑt/Kt, the




with Φ(τ) ≡ (γτ)1/(1+γ). Because τ is ﬁxed by the government and therefore has no transitional
dynamics, P is independent of time.
3 The general equilibrium and the balanced growth path
The ﬁnal market clearing condition is:
Yt = Ct + ˙ Kt + Dt,
Diﬀerentiating (6) with respect to time and using the expression of dKt/dt and dΩt/dt gives:
˙ Ct/Ct = rt − % − λ(% + λ)Kt/Ct (11)
Aggregate consumption growth diﬀers from individual consumption growth (given by equa-
tion 4) by the term λKt/Ct which represents what Heijdra and Ligthart (2000) called the
“generational turnover eﬀect”. This eﬀect appears because at each date a new generation is
born and a cross-section of the existing population dies. Because new agents born without
ﬁnancial assets, their consumption is lower than the average consumption and therefore the
“generational turnover eﬀect” reduces the growth rate of the aggregate consumption. This gen-
erational eﬀect rises with the probability to die λ: on one hand, agents die at a higher frequency
(that increases the generational turnover) and on the other hand the propensity to consume
out of wealth % + λ increases due to the shorter horizon.X. Pautrel – Environmental policy, human capital and growth with ﬁnite lifetimes 9
Diﬀerentiating (7) with respect to time and using the fact that us,t = ut,6 the aggregate
accumulation of human capital is:
˙ Ht = B [1 − ut]Ht − (1 − η)λHt
The ﬁrst term in the right-hand side of the equation represents the increase in the aggregate
human capital due to the investment of each alive generation in education at time t. The second
term represents the loss of human capital due to the vanishing of dying generation net from the
intergenerational transmission of human capital. Indeed, on the one hand, a part λ of the living
cohort born at s with a stock of human capital equal to hs,tλe−λ(t−s) vanishes reducing growth
by λ
R t
−∞ hs,tλe−λ(t−s)ds = λHt when all generations are aggregated. On the other hand, at the
same time, a new cohort of size λ appears, adding λht,t to growth, with ht,t = ηHt and η ∈ ]0,1[
(see above). This net loss reduces the aggregate accumulation of human capital.
Using previous results,7 we can write the dynamics of the model as:
˙ xt =






˙ bt = {B [1 − ut] − (1 − η)λ − (btut)1−α + xt + Φ(τ)}bt
˙ ut = {(α−1 − 1)B + (α−1 − 1)Φ(τ) + But − (α−1 + η − 1)λ − xt}ut
(12)
where xt ≡ Ct/Kt and bt ≡ Ht/Kt.
Along the balanced growth path, C, K, H, D and Y evolve at a common positive rate and
the allocation of human capital across sectors is constant. Consequently, from (6) ˙ x = ˙ b = ˙ u =




? − ηλ − %]{[u
? + A]B − λ[A + η] + AΦ(τ)} − λ(% + λ) = 0 (13)
with A ≡ α−1 − 1 > 0.
6Using (9), the equalization of the rates of return given by equation (5) implies that the rate of return to
human capital is independent of s, therefore all individuals allocate the same eﬀort to schooling: us,t = ut.
7From (5), (9) and the fact that
R t
−∞ us,ths,tλe−λ(t−s)ds = utHt because us,t = ut, we obtain ˙ ut/ut =
˙ Kt/Kt − ˙ Ht/Ht − α−1 [rt + λ − B].X. Pautrel – Environmental policy, human capital and growth with ﬁnite lifetimes 10
This equality deﬁnes a unique u? ∈]0,1[ which decreases with τ, for τ ∈]τ, ¯ τ[ (see appendix
A). This last condition means that the pollution tax must be higher than a minimal value in
order to encourage agents to invest in human capital accumulation. Note that when lifetime is
inﬁnite, λ = 0, the allocation of human capital into the production u? is independent from τ
along the balanced growth path.8 When the horizon shortens (λ increases), the allocation of
human capital into ﬁnal production u? rises: agents invest less in human capital. Finally, using









The increase in the environmental tax leads the ﬁnal production to be less intensive in physical
capital and more intensive in human capital because it increases the cost of physical capital: b?















and is an increasing function of the environmental tax rate.9
Finally, the growth of the market economy along the BGP is:
g
? = B [1 − u
?(τ)] − (1 − η)λ.
The BGP rate of growth increases with τ: environmental policy has a positive impact because
it encourages agents to invest more in the no-pollutant factor of production: the human capital.
Consequently, by assuming ﬁnite lifetime, it is possible to implement a win-win environmental
policy in a Lucas (1988) growth model. Nevertheless, the environmental tax rate must be higher
than ˆ τ > τ to have g? > 0: a minimum environmental policy is required to obtain a sustainable
equilibrium in the market economy.
Note that if the horizon is short (λ is high), the eﬀect of the environmental policy on growth
is greater, as demonstrated in appendix A.
8When λ = 0, u? is deﬁned (from equation 13) by Γ(u?) ≡ [Bu? − %]{[u? + A]B + AΦ(τ)} = 0. It is
straightforward that the positive solution of this equality is u? = %/B > 0 like in Lucas (1988).
9Note that, when lifetime is inﬁnite (λ = 0), b? and x? remain increasing functions of τ.X. Pautrel – Environmental policy, human capital and growth with ﬁnite lifetimes 11
4 The transitional dynamics
In this section we examine the features of the equilibrium and we investigate the trajectory
of the economy out of the steady-state using the time-elimination method. We compare the
inﬂuence of the environmental policy during the transition both when lifetime is ﬁnite and
when lifetime is inﬁnite.



















x? + λ(% + λ)x?−1 (α − 1)b?−αu?1−αx? (α − 1)u?−αb?1−αx?











? + λ(% + λ)x
?−1
< 0
and (from ˙ xt = 0 in the steady-state)
Trace(J) = 2λ(% + λ)x
?−1 + % + bu
? > 0
Because there are two control variables (u and x) and one state-variable (b), the negative
determinant and the positive trace of the Jacobian matrix imply that there are two positive
eigenvalues and one negative eigenvalue. Therefore, the equilibrium is saddle-path stable.
Due to the complexity of the model, we use numerical simulations to look at the transitional
dynamics, and especially the transitional impact of the environmental tax. We calibrate the
model to obtain realistic values of the growth rate of GDP and the probability of death for the
US economy. From the World Development Indicators 2005 by the World Bank, life expectancy
was 77.4 years in 2003, the growth rate was 3.3% during the period 1990-2002 and a public
health expenditures as percentage of GDP was 6.55%. Since the expected lifetime is the reverseX. Pautrel – Environmental policy, human capital and growth with ﬁnite lifetimes 12
of the probability of death per unit of time λ, we want λ to be close to 1/77.4 = 0.0128. We
adjust other variables to obtain such values for our benchmark case.
Table 1 summarizes the benchmark value of parameters and Table 2 summarizes the exercise
of comparative statics for log utility.
α η % B γ λ(1) λ(2)
0.3 0.85 0.025 0.0735 0.3 0.0128 0
(1) ﬁnite lifetime (2) inﬁnite lifetime
Table 1. Benchmark value of parameters
Finite lifetime Inﬁnite lifetime
λ = 0.0128 λ = 0.0200
τ = 0.01 τ = 0.1 τ = 0.01 τ = 0.1 τ = 0.01 τ = 0.1
g? 3.32% 3.42% 2.35% 2.55% 4.85% 4.85%
P? 3.82 2.24 3.82 2.24 3.82 2.24
u? 0.5218 0.5084 0.6389 0.6109 0.3401 0.3401
r?(1) 0.0607 0.0607 0.0535 0.0535 0.0735 0.0735
x?(2) 0.1959 0.3254 0.1815 0.3100 0.2233 0.3537
b?(3) 0.2503 0.5831 0.1760 0.4468 0.4849 0.9986
(1)αY/K − Φ(τ) (2)C/K (3)H/K
Table 2. The increase in the environmental tax along the BGP
Graph 1 and Graph 2 draw the temporal evolution of the main variables towards the new
steady-state when an unanticipated increase in the environmental tax is implemented by the
government, respectively for ﬁnite and inﬁnite lifetime.
What diﬀers between ﬁnite and inﬁnite lifetime is mainly the size of the variations and the
fact that all variables tend towards a new steady-state value in the ﬁnite lifetime case. Let
consider this case to look at the out-of steady-state evolution of variables (Graph 2).
First of all, an increase in the environmental taxation lowers instantaneously the interest rate
(Figure 4 in Graph 2) and drops the growth rate of physical capital which becomes negative
(Figure 6 in Graph 2). Because the returns to education becomes higher, agents allocate
their resource towards human capital accumulation: the allocation of human capital into theX. Pautrel – Environmental policy, human capital and growth with ﬁnite lifetimes 13
manufacturing sector falls (Figure 1 in Graph 2) while the growth rate of human capital jumps
(Figure 5 in Graph 2). The manufacturing sector becomes more intensive in human capital
and the ratio human capital to physical capital (b) rises (Figure 2 in Graph 2). The fall in u
and the increase in b contributes to rise the interest rate and reduces the incentives of agents
to allocate human capital into the educational sector: u rises while the increase in the human
capital physical capital ratio decelerates. This continues up to the interest rate comes to its
initial value (which equals B + λ). While the allocation of human capital into production
and the growth rates of the physical capital, the human capital, consumption and ﬁnal output
back to their initial steady-state value when the lifetime of agents is inﬁnite, this is not the
case when the lifetime is ﬁnite (see Graph 1): agents allocate more human capital into the
educational sector (u? is lower) and that promotes human capital accumulation, aggregate
consumption growth and aggregate output growth. It comes from the generational turnover
eﬀect on the aggregate consumption growth whose size relies on the aggregate consumption to
physical capital ratio.10 Because during the transition, this ratio increases, in the same time the
generational turnover eﬀect reduces (the diﬀerence between the consumption of the newborn
and the average consumption lowers), and the aggregate consumption growth is fostered (with
respect to the inﬁnite case).
5 Discussion
In the previous section, we demonstrated that the “generational turnover eﬀect” , due to the
appearance of newborn at each date and the death of a part of the population, leads to a
positive impact of the environmental policy in the Lucas (1988) model without assuming that
a better environmental quality enhances ability to learn, that labor supply is elastic or that
education enters the utility function as a consumption good.
10Remark that the externality in the aggregate human capital accumulation due to the generational turnover
(1 − η)λHt is not required to obtain our result. Letting η = 1 in equation (13), that is assuming that all the
human capital of the dying generation is inherited by newborn, the allocation of human capital into production
u? remains negatively inﬂuenced by the environmental tax. The only eﬀect is a higher growth rate in the
steady-state.X. Pautrel – Environmental policy, human capital and growth with ﬁnite lifetimes 14
Nevertheless, according to empirical evidence, education is not only the fruit of a private time
investment. It requires either physical capital (see for example King and Rebelo, 1990) or public
expenditures (see for example Glomm and Ravikumar, 2001). Furthermore, as highlighted by
Hettich (1998), the assumption about the source of pollution may completely change the impact
of the environmental policy on growth. Do our results continue to hold when the technology in
the educational sector is modiﬁed in such a way and/or when an alternative source of pollution
is introduced?
5.1 Education good in human capital accumulation
Following Rebelo (1991), we consider that, besides time, education requires an educational
input produced with physical and human capital. To simplify things we suppose that it is
produced in the same way than the ﬁnal output. The fact that households buy an educational
input will modify their decisions to invest their time to educational activities and the inﬂuence
of the environmental policy on human capital accumulation and growth.
At time t, each agent born at s buy zs,t units of ﬁnal output which increase the productivity
of the time that they invest in education, such as:





˙ as,t = [rt + λ]as,t + us,ths,twt − cs,t − zs,t (15)
Utility maximization implies that us,t and the ratio
zs,t
hs,t
are independent from s (conve-
niently, we denote ˜ zt ≡
zs,t
(1 − us,t)hs,t













t = rt + λ (17)X. Pautrel – Environmental policy, human capital and growth with ﬁnite lifetimes 15
The aggregate accumulation of human capital is then written as
˙ Ht = B(1 − ut)˜ z
δ
t − (1 − η)λ (18)
The amount of ﬁnal output used as educational good is Zt ≡
Z t
−∞
zs,tλe−λ(t−s)ds = ˜ zt(1−ut)Ht



















Yt = ˙ Kt + Ct + Φ(τ) (20)





















B(1 − ut)[δ(1 − δ)
−1(1 − α)(btut)
−α]








































−αδ = 0 (21)
This relation states b?u? as an increasing function of Φ(τ). We deﬁne R(τ) ≡ b?u? with
dR(τ)/dτ > 0. The two remaining equations of the dynamical system evaluated at the steady-








?)Φ(τ) − [(1 − δ)A1(u








−αδ = 0 (22)X. Pautrel – Environmental policy, human capital and growth with ﬁnite lifetimes 16








> 0. Since Υ(u?) is a decreasing
function of u?, it deﬁnes a unique allocation of human capital to production in the steady-state.
Nevertheless, it also imposes that the part of the education good in the accumulation of human
capital does not exceed u?. Finally, the impact of the environmental taxation on u? is no
clear-cut. Consequently, conversely to the case where only time is used as input in education,
here the inﬂuence of the environmental taxation on the allocation of time in education is not
obvious.
When we consider the case of inﬁnite lifetime (λ = 0), u? is independent from τ and because
the aggregate accumulation of human capital then only depends negatively on the human capital
to physical capital ratio, growth in the economy decreases with the environmental taxation due
to the crowding-out eﬀect of the environmental taxation. When lifetime is ﬁnite (λ > 0), the
previous eﬀect exists, through the human capital to physical capital ratio, but there is also
the “generational turnover eﬀect” which operates in the opposite way. Is it high enough to
compensate or to oﬀset the crowding-out eﬀect? That is the question we investigate in the
following.
The aggregate growth rate in the economy is given by:
g




δ − (1 − η)λ (23)
Because the impact of the environmental taxation on u? is ambiguous and because R(τ) is
positively inﬂuenced by the environmental tax, the global impact on the steady-state growth
rate is not clear-cut and very cumbersome to derive analytically. That the reason why we use
numerical simulations to investigate this impact. Because we demonstrated that the environ-
mental policy enhances growth when only time is used as input for education (that is δ = 0)
and it is straightforward from our previous results that environmental policy is harmful for
growth when only ﬁnal output is used to increase human capital (that is δ = 1), we look at
the impact of an increase in environmental taxation for diﬀerent values of δ the part of human
capital accumulation made by the education good. We report results in table 3.
The ﬁrst insight of our simulations is that the positive eﬀect of the environmental policyX. Pautrel – Environmental policy, human capital and growth with ﬁnite lifetimes 17
due to ﬁnite lifetime exists, for the parameters values chosen. The second insight is that this
positive eﬀect oﬀsets the crowding-out eﬀect only if the part of the education good in human
capital accumulation (δ) is small enough.
Consequently, the mechanism highlighted in the previous sections, based on the “genera-
tional turnover eﬀect” due to ﬁnite lifetime still operates when an education good (produced
with human and physical capital) is introduced, but it is reduced and may be oﬀset if the part
of time that individuals invest in education becomes too small.
Table 3. Impact of the environmental policy according to δ.
δ = 0.01 δ = 0.08 δ = 0.09 δ = 0.5
τ = 0.01 τ = 0.1 τ = 0.01 τ = 0.1 τ = 0.01 τ = 0.1 τ = 0.01 τ = 0.1
g? 3.05% 3.15% 1.907% 1.914% 1.785% 1.778% 0.195% -0.099%
P? 3.82 2.24 3.82 2.24 3.82 2.24 3.82 2.24
u? 0.5567 0.5429 0.7070 0.6991 0.7232 0.7167 0.9299 0.9804
r? 0.0569 0.0567 0.0445 0.0431 0.0434 0.0419 0.0334 0.0266
x? (C/K) 0.1858 0.3136 0.1539 0.2750 0.1513 0.2718 0.1257 0.2419
b? (H/K) 0.2171 0.5219 0.1283 0.3435 0.1220 0.3297 0.0712 0.1944
| {z } | {z }
Positive eﬀect on growth Negative eﬀect on growth
5.2 Alternative specification of pollution
As demonstrated by Hettich (1998), the speciﬁcation of pollution may modify the impact of the
environmental taxation on growth. In a Uzawa-Lucas (1988) model with elastic labor supply,
he ﬁnds that the environmental taxation enhances growth when the source of pollution is the
stock of physical capital. Nevertheless, assuming that the source of pollution is rather ﬁnal
output, he obtains no eﬀect of the environmental taxation. Indeed, when ﬁnal production is
the source of pollution, the environmental tax not only impacts the interest rate, but also the
wage rate, erasing the positive eﬀect which transits through the elastic labor supply. In this
section, we re-examine our previous results assuming that the source of pollution is ﬁnal output
rather than physical capital.X. Pautrel – Environmental policy, human capital and growth with ﬁnite lifetimes 18
































Deﬁning ˆ τ ≡ ϑt/Yt, the environmental tax normalized by the ﬁnal output production we obtain:
P = Φ(ˆ τ)
−γ
Dt = Φ(ˆ τ)Yt
with Φ(ˆ τ) ≡ (γˆ τ)1/(1+γ).
The ﬁnal market clearing condition becomes:
[1 − Φ(ˆ τ)]Yt = Ct + ˙ Kt
and the dynamical system gets
˙ xt =

[1 − Φ(ˆ τ)](α − 1)(btut)














−1 − 1)B + But − (α
−1 + η − 1)λ − xt
	
ut
Solving it in the steady-state, the last equation of the system gives
x
? = (α
−1 − 1)B + Bu
? − (α
−1 + η − 1)λX. Pautrel – Environmental policy, human capital and growth with ﬁnite lifetimes 19
and from the two ﬁrst equations evaluated at the steady-state, we obtain
% + λ(% + λ)x
?−1 = −(1 − α)B(1 − u
?) + (1 − α)(1 − η)λ + αx
?
The two previous expressions enable to state the steady-state value u?. It is straightforward
that the time allocation to production is independent from the environmental taxation, like
in Hettich (1998) and consequently, despite ﬁnite lifetime, the environmental policy does not
aﬀect the growth rate in the steady-state.
Nevertheless, let’s consider the case of the previous section where ﬁnal output is used in
the educational activity. With production ﬂow arising from the ﬁnal output rather physical
capital, the dynamical system becomes:
˙ xt =


















B(1 − ut)[δ(1 − δ)
−1(1 − α)(btut)
−α]
δ − (1 − η)λ
−




























Along the steady-state, from the last equation of the previous system
(1 − Φ(ˆ τ))α(b
?u
?)






−αδ = 0 (25)
This relation states b?u? as an increasing function of Φ(τ). We deﬁne ˆ R(τ) ≡ b?u? with
d ˆ R(τ)/dτ > 0. The allocation of human capital into the output sector in the steady-state u?
is given by the equality:
λ(% + λ)
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with 1 + δ − δ
u? > 0 and (1 − u?) − (1 − δ)δδ > 0 (see Appendix C). This equality deﬁnes
a unique u? which decreases in τ. Because the growth rate in the steady-state remains g? =
B(1 − u?) − (1 − η)λ, the environmental policy has a positive impact on the growth rate in
the steady-state when the ﬂow of pollution arises from the stock of physical capital and ﬁnal
output is used as education good in human capital accumulation.
6 Conclusion
This article demonstrates that, if ﬁnite lifetime is taken into account, a win-win environmental
policy may be implemented in an economy where growth is driven by human capital accumu-
lation à la Lucas (1988), while pollution does not inﬂuence educational activities, labor supply
is not elastic and human capital does not enter the utility function. This is because ﬁnite
lifetime and the appearance of newborns at each date creates a turnover of generations which
disconnects the aggregate consumption growth to the interest rate. We show that the shorter
is the horizon, the greater the eﬀect of the environmental policy on growth, because the higher
the “generational turnover eﬀect” .
We also demonstrate that when time is not the single production factor in education, the
environmental policy promotes growth only if time remains the predominant factor. Otherwise,
the crowding-out eﬀect of the tighter environmental policy dominates the “generational turnover
eﬀect” and growth diminishes.
Finally, when the source of pollution is ﬁnal output rather than physical capital and time
is the single factor in education, the environmental does not aﬀect growth in the steady-state,
despite the “generational turnover eﬀect” . Nevertheless, if the education good is introduced,
the positive inﬂuence of the environmental policy appears again.Graph 1. Transitional effects of an increase in the 
environmental tax with INFINITE lifetime 
 
       
  
Graph 2. Transitional effects of an increase in the 
environmental tax with FINITE lifetime 
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Appendix A
On the one hand , combining the equations of (12), we obtain x? = [u? + A]B − λ[A + η] +
AΦ(τ) > 0 and on the other hand we ﬁnd x? =
λ(%+λ)
Bu?−ηλ−% > 0. Equalizing these two expressions
gives Γ(u?), which is the diﬀerence between two positive terms:
Γ(u
?) ≡ {Bu
? − ηλ − %}{[u
? + A]B − λ[A + η] + AΦ(τ)} − λ(% + λ) = 0
with A ≡ α−1 − 1 > 0.
From the implicit function theorem, the inﬂuence of τ on u? is given by u?0 ≡ −
∂Γ(u?)/∂τ
∂Γ(u?)/∂u?.
If we note Γ(u) = Γ1(u) × Γ2(u) − λ(% + λ), from the previous footnote it comes that Γ1(u?)
and Γ2(u?) are both positive. Therefore u?0 =
−Aχ0(τ)Γ1(u?)
B[Γ1(u?)+Γ2(u?)] is negative and u? is a decreasing
function of τ. Γ(u?) = 0 deﬁnes a unique value for u? ∈]0,1[ if Γ(0) < 0 and Γ(1) > 0. These
two conditions deﬁne τ and ¯ τ such that Γ(0)|τ=¯ τ = 0 and Γ(1)|τ=τ = 0.
If we note g?0 = dg?/dτ = −Bu?0, the eﬀect of the environmental policy on growth













, the sign if its derivative with respect to λ is the same than the sign







B[Γ1(u?)+Γ2(u?)] > 0, we obtain
∂Γ1(u?)
∂λ = B ∂u?
∂λ − η = A
B[Γ1(u?)+Γ2(u?)] > 0. Consequently
dg?0/dλ > 0.
Appendix B
At time t, each agent born at s buy zs,t units of ﬁnal output which increase the productivity
of the time that they invest in education, such as:










s [logcs,t − ζ logPt]e−(%+λ)(t−s)dt
s.t. ˙ as,t = [rt + λ]as,t + us,ths,twt − cs,t − zs,t




The Hamiltonian of the program may be written as:

































= −˙ π1,t + (% + λ)π1,t ⇒ π1,t(rt + λ) = −˙ π1,t + (% + λ)π1,t (29)
∂H
∂hs,t
= −˙ π2,t + (% + λ)π2,t ⇒






= −˙ π2,t + (% + λ)π2,t (30)X. Pautrel – Environmental policy, human capital and growth with ﬁnite lifetimes 26
∂H
∂hs,t
= −˙ π2,t + (% + λ)π2,t ⇒






= −˙ π2,t + (% + λ)π2,t (31)
First of all, equation (28) implies that the ratio
zs,t
(1−us,t)hs,t is independent from s and equation
(31) implies that us,t is independent from s. Consequently, the ratio
zs,t
hs,t is independent from
s. Conveniently, we denote ˜ zt ≡
zs,t
(1−us,t)hs,t.
From (26) and (29), we obtain
˙ cs,t = (rt − %)cs,t





It implies that us,t = ut independent from s. Furthermore (27) and (31) give:
˙ π2,t
π2,t
= % + λ − B [1 − δ] ˜ z
δ
t












Replacing by the expressions of ˙ π1,t







+ B(1 − δ)˜ z
δ
t = rt + λ
which means that the returns to education must be equal to the returns to physical capital.








t = rt + λ
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(1 − us,t)hs,tλe−λ(t−s)ds = ˜ zt(1 − ut)
Z t
−∞




















Yt = ˙ Kt + Ct + Φ(τ)
and the aggregate accumulation of human capital is:
˙ Ht = B(1 − ut)˜ z
δ
t − (1 − η)λ













































The two ﬁrst equations of the dynamical system (24) evaluated in the steady-state (˙ xt = 0 and






B(u? − δ)[δ(1 − δ)−1(1 − α)R(τ)−α]δ − % − ηλ





? = (1 − α)













−αδ − ηλX. Pautrel – Environmental policy, human capital and growth with ﬁnite lifetimes 28
with 1 + δ − δ
u? > 0 and (1 − u?) − (1 − δ)δδ > 0.










In this appendix, we relax the assumption of logarithmic utility to show that this simplifying
assumption does not the qualitative results.











with σ 6= 1 the elasticity of intertemporal substitution.
The individual consumption of an agent born at s becomes
cs,t = ∆
−1





t rµdµdν > 0 is the propensity to consume out of wealth.11







t [Kt + Ωt] (36)
The aggregate consumption growth rate (equation 11) becomes
˙ Ct = σ [rt − %]Ct − λ∆
−1
t Kt
Finally, the dynamics of the economy is summarized by the following system (with respect to
the case where σ = 1, the intertemporal evolution of the propensity to consume out of wealth











˙ bt = {B (1 − ut) − (1 − η)λ − (btut)1−α + xt + Φ(τ)}bt
˙ ut = {(α−1 − 1)B + (α−1 − 1)Φ(τ) + But − (α−1 + 1 − η)λ − xt}ut
˙ ∆t = −1 + [(1 − σ)α(btut)1−α − (1 − σ)Φ(τ) + σ% + λ]∆t
(37)
where xt ≡ Ct/Kt and bt ≡ Ht/Kt.
Along the balanced growth path, the allocation of human capital into the manufacturing
sector is deﬁned by:
Γs(u
?) ≡ [B (σ − 1 + u
?) + (1 − σ − η)λ − σ%]{[u
? + A]B − λ[A + η] + AΦ(τ)}
− λ∆
?−1 = 0 (38)
with A ≡ α−1−1 > 0 and ∆?−1 = σ%+σλ+(1−σ)B > 0. It is straightforward that Γs(u?) = 0
deﬁnes a unique u? decreasing with τ.NOTE DI LAVORO DELLA FONDAZIONE ENI ENRICO MATTEI 
Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei Working Paper Series 











NOTE DI LAVORO PUBLISHED IN 2008 
CCMP 1.2008  Valentina Bosetti, Carlo Carraro and Emanuele Massetti: Banking Permits: Economic Efficiency and 
Distributional Effects 
CCMP 2.2008  Ruslana Palatnik and Mordechai Shechter: Can Climate Change Mitigation Policy Benefit the Israeli Economy? 
A Computable General Equilibrium Analysis 
KTHC 3.2008  Lorenzo Casaburi, Valeria Gattai and G. Alfredo Minerva: Firms’ International Status and Heterogeneity in 
Performance: Evidence From Italy 
KTHC 4.2008  Fabio Sabatini: Does Social Capital Mitigate Precariousness? 
SIEV 5.2008  Wisdom Akpalu: On the Economics of Rational Self-Medication 
CCMP 6.2008  Carlo Carraro and Alessandra Sgobbi: Climate Change Impacts and Adaptation Strategies In Italy. An 
Economic Assessment 
ETA 7.2008  Elodie Rouvière and Raphaël Soubeyran: Collective Reputation, Entry and Minimum Quality Standard 
IEM 8.2008  Cristina Cattaneo, Matteo Manera and Elisa Scarpa: Industrial Coal Demand in China:  A Provincial Analysis 
IEM 9.2008  Massimiliano Serati, Matteo Manera and Michele Plotegher: Econometric Models for Electricity Prices: A 
Critical Survey 
CCMP 10.2008  Bob van der Zwaan and Reyer Gerlagh: The Economics of Geological CO2 Storage and Leakage 
KTHC 11.2008  Maria Francesca Cracolici and Teodora Erika Uberti: Geographical Distribution of Crime in Italian Provinces: 
A Spatial Econometric Analysis 
KTHC 12.2008  Victor Ginsburgh, Shlomo Weber and Sheila Weyers: Economics of Literary Translation. A Simple Theory and 
Evidence 
NRM 13.2008  Carlo Giupponi, Jaroslav Mysiak and Alessandra Sgobbi: Participatory Modelling and Decision Support for 
Natural Resources Management in Climate Change Research 
NRM 14.2008  Yaella Depietri and Carlo Giupponi: Science-Policy Communication for Improved Water Resources 
Management: Contributions of the Nostrum-DSS Project 
CCMP 15.2008  Valentina Bosetti, Alexander Golub, Anil Markandya, Emanuele Massetti and Massimo Tavoni: Abatement Cost 
Uncertainty and Policy Instrument Selection under a Stringent Climate Policy. A Dynamic Analysis 
KTHC 16.2008  Francesco D’Amuri, Gianmarco I.P. Ottaviano and Giovanni Peri: The Labor Market Impact of Immigration in 
Western Germany in the 1990’s 
KTHC 17.2008  Jean Gabszewicz, Victor Ginsburgh and Shlomo Weber: Bilingualism and Communicative Benefits 
CCMP 18.2008  Benno Torgler, María A.GarcíaValiñas  and Alison Macintyre: Differences in Preferences Towards the 
Environment: The Impact of a Gender, Age and Parental Effect 
PRCG 19.2008  Gian Luigi Albano and Berardino Cesi: Past Performance Evaluation in Repeated Procurement: A Simple Model 
of Handicapping 
CTN 20.2008  Pedro Pintassilgo, Michael Finus, Marko Lindroos and Gordon Munro (lxxxiv): Stability and Success of 
Regional Fisheries Management Organizations 
CTN 21.2008  Hubert Kempf and Leopold von Thadden (lxxxiv): On Policy Interactions Among Nations: When Do 
Cooperation and Commitment Matter? 
CTN 22.2008  Markus Kinateder (lxxxiv): Repeated Games Played in a Network 
CTN 23.2008  Taiji Furusawa and Hideo Konishi (lxxxiv): Contributing or Free-Riding? A Theory of Endogenous Lobby 
Formation 
CTN 24.2008  Paolo Pin, Silvio Franz and Matteo Marsili (lxxxiv): Opportunity and Choice in Social Networks 
CTN 25.2008  Vasileios Zikos (lxxxiv): R&D Collaboration Networks in Mixed Oligopoly 
CTN 26.2008  Hans-Peter Weikard and Rob Dellink (lxxxiv): Sticks and Carrots for the Design of International Climate 
Agreements with Renegotiations 
CTN 27.2008  Jingang Zhao (lxxxiv): The Maximal Payoff and Coalition Formation in Coalitional Games 
CTN 28.2008  Giacomo Pasini, Paolo Pin and Simon Weidenholzer (lxxxiv): A Network Model of Price Dispersion 
CTN 29.2008  Ana Mauleon, Vincent Vannetelbosch and Wouter Vergote (lxxxiv): Von Neumann-Morgenstern Farsightedly 
Stable Sets in Two-Sided Matching 
CTN 30.2008  Rahmi İlkiliç (lxxxiv): Network of Commons 
CTN 31.2008  Marco J. van der Leij and I. Sebastian Buhai (lxxxiv): A Social Network Analysis of Occupational Segregation 
CTN 32.2008  Billand Pascal, Frachisse David and Massard Nadine  (lxxxiv): The Sixth Framework Program as an Affiliation 
Network: Representation and Analysis 
CTN 33.2008  Michèle Breton, Lucia Sbragia and Georges Zaccour (lxxxiv): Dynamic Models for International Environmental 
Agreements PRCG 34.2008  Carmine Guerriero: The Political Economy of Incentive Regulation: Theory and Evidence from US States 
IEM 35.2008  Irene Valsecchi: Learning from Experts 
PRCG 36.2008  P. A. Ferrari and S. Salini: Measuring Service Quality: The Opinion of Europeans about Utilities 
ETA 37.2008  Michele Moretto and Gianpaolo Rossini: Vertical Integration and Operational Flexibility 
CCMP 38.2008  William K. Jaeger and Van Kolpin: The Environmental Kuznets Curve from Multiple Perspectives 
PRCG 39.2008  Benno Torgler and Bin Dong: Corruption and Political Interest: Empirical Evidence at the Micro Level 
KTHC 40.2008  Laura Onofri, Paulo A.L.D. Nunes, Jasone Cenoz and Durk Gorter: Language Diversity in Urban Landscapes: 
An econometric study 
CTN 41.2008  Michel Le Breton, Valery Makarov, Alexei Savvateev and Shlomo Weber (lxxxiv): Multiple Membership and 
Federal Sructures 
NRM 42.2008  Gideon Kruseman and Lorenzo Pellegrini: Institutions and Forest Management: A Case Study from Swat, 
Pakistan 
SIEV 43.2008  Pietro Caratti and Ludovico Ferraguto: Analysing Regional Sustainability Through a Systemic Approach: The 
Lombardy Case Study 
KTHC 44.2008  Barbara Del Corpo, Ugo Gasparino, Elena Bellini and William Malizia: Effects of Tourism Upon the Economy 
of Small and Medium-Sized European Cities. Cultural Tourists and “The Others” 
CTN 45.2008  Dinko Dimitrov and Emiliya Lazarova: Coalitional Matchings 
ETA 46.2008  Joan Canton, Maia David and Bernard Sinclair-Desgagné: Environmental Regulation and Horizontal Mergers 
in the Eco-industry 
ETA 47.2008  Stéphane Hallegatte: A Proposal for a New Prescriptive Discounting Scheme: The Intergenerational Discount 
Rate 
KTHC 48.2008  Angelo Antoci, Paolo Russu and Elisa Ticci: Structural Change, Environment and Well-being: Interactions 
Between Production and Consumption Choices of the Rich and the Poor in Developing Countries 
PRCG 49.2008  Gian Luigi Albano, Federico Dini Roberto Zampino and Marta Fana: The Determinants of Suppliers’ 
Performance in E-Procurement: Evidence from the Italian Government’s E-Procurement Platform 
CCMP 50.2008  Inmaculada Martínez-Zarzoso: The Impact of Urbanization on CO2 Emissions: Evidence from Developing 
Countries 
KTHC 51.2008  Michele Moretto and Sergio Vergalli: Managing Migration through Quotas: an Option-theory Perspective 
KTHC 52.2008  Ugo Gasparino, Elena Bellini, Barbara Del Corpo and William Malizia: Measuring the Impact of Tourism 
Upon Urban Economies: A Review of Literature 
ETA 53.2008  Reyer Gerlagh, Snorre Kverndokk and Knut Einar Rosendahl: Linking Environmental and Innovation Policy 
KTHC 54.2008  Oguzhan C. Dincer and Burak Gunalp: Corruption, Income Inequality, and Poverty in the United States 
PRCG 55.2008  Carmine Guerriero: Accountability in Government and Regulatory Policies: Theory and Evidence 
KTHC 56.2008  Tanmoyee Banerjee (Chatterjee) and Nilanjana Mitra: Export, Assembly-line FDI or FDI with the Possibility of 
Technology Diffusion: Optimal Entry Mode for Multinationals 




(lxxxiv) This paper was presented at the 13th Coalition Theory Network Workshop organised by the 






  2008 SERIES 
  CCMP  Climate Change Modelling and Policy  (Editor: Carlo Carraro) 
  SIEV  Sustainability Indicators and Environmental Valuation (Editor: Anil Markandya) 
  NRM  Natural Resources Management  (Editor: Carlo Giupponi) 
  KTHC  Knowledge, Technology, Human Capital  (Editor: Gianmarco Ottaviano) 
  IEM  International Energy Markets (Editor: Matteo Manera) 
  CSRM  Corporate Social Responsibility and Sustainable Management (Editor: Giulio Sapelli) 
  PRCG  Privatisation Regulation Corporate Governance (Editor: Bernardo Bortolotti) 
  ETA  Economic Theory and Applications (Editor: Carlo Carraro) 
  CTN  Coalition Theory Network 
 
 
 
 
 
 